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BOOK REVIEWS
The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws. By WALTER
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942. Pp. xx,
WHEELER COOK.
473.
"If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken
Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools-""
RUDYARD KIPLING

"Veritas Vos Liberabit"'
JOHN

8:32

The author's preface, his segregated 1942 additions in this book to the reprints of articles previously written, and his bracketed footnotes as added to
such articles, indicate his feeling that his statements have often been misunderstood, if not misused, and that he wants to do all in his power to prevent
this. The reviewer sympathizes fully, because on some occasions, he has
heard Professor Cook abused by some listener or reader who has not considered carefully the subject matter of his criticism. It is frequently easier
to find fault with an assumed position than to discover or criticize the real
position of one's opponent. If one reads closely the writings of Professor
Cook, it is difficult (for this reviewer impossible) to find any misrepresentation of the cases he discusses or any logical flaws in his arguments.
The instant work is a culmination of many years of effort on the part of
Professor Cook to subject the field of conflict of laws to scientific inquiry
under the method of "scientific empiricism" as previously elaborated by the
same author.2 This grew out of his being asked to teach the subject in 1919,
without ever having been exposed to the current dogma in the field, and his
conclusion after an open-minded study of the cases before consulting treatises
or articles (and then later reading the treatises, etc.) "that nearly all writers
were obsessed with indefensible theories which neither accounted for what the
courts were doing nor led to useful decisions if logically applied."
This early conclusion led to his presentation before the Association of
American Law Schools in 1923 of a paper, since well known as a published
article.3 This article was followed from time to time by other articles on
various phases of conflict of laws, indicating that they were to become parts
of a forthcoming book. The instant work is comprised of those already published articles4 (with certain 1942 footnotes and text supplements added) and
'Motto of the Johns Hopkins University. Prefacing this review with short quotations
is perhaps the result of the reviewer's high-school liking for the Waverly Novels of
Sir Walter Scott, revived by Professor Cook's practice of so treating each of his chapters.
For example, for the chapter on "Capacity to Marry," where issue is taken with the
manner of stating the conflict of laws rule which goes back to Story's treatise, Professor
Cook quotes from Shakespeare, "The evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft
interred with their bones." Is there any doubt of the author's attitude toward Story's
orthodox
rule?
2
See the author's philosophy as expressed in My Philosophy of Law, Credos of Sixteen
American
Legal Scholars (Boston, 1941).
3
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457.
4Ch. I, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (33 YALE L. 3. 457, 1924) ;
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several chapters. not previously published. 5 The book takes its title from the
first article, and the article (with minor additions of footnotes and brief
supplementary comment) becomes the first chapter of the book. It sets up
the belief that law is capable of scientific study and analysis, that this invokes
the appropriate use of both deduction and induction, and that the field of
conflict of laws is in particularly bad shape because of the unscientific (and
illogical) behavior of the writers and judges. This is supported by an analysis
of many decisions showing the logical fallacies in their use of terminology
and the unscientific use of postulates, not supported by any real testing by
inductive method of their contents. While this chapter thus illustrates the
appropriate application of scientific method broadly to the field of conflict of
laws, it serves also the purpose of establishing a correct description of what
the judge does when he decides a conflict of laws case, as compared to judicially stated theories which the author feels are incorrect.
This description, or theory, is simply that the "law" of a conflict of laws
decision like the "law" of any other decision is the "local law" of the forum
deciding the case, namely its own conflict of laws rule. There is no application of foreign law (as such) or enforcement of a foreign created legal
right (as such), as the customary manner of statement would lead one to
believe. The reference made by the conflict of laws rule to the "law" of some
state other than the forum is a short-hand way of saying that the forum is
creating in its own legal system a right and remedy as similar as possible to.
what the jurisdiction of reference would have done in a purely domestic case.
The forum so acts because of the policy of the forum to treat conflict of laws
situations differently from its own purely domestic ones, in order to accomplish the more just result of not restricting the parties to the normal domestic
rules of a forum which might have little or no contact with the substance
of their relations.
This theory is in opposition to the "comity" theory of Story and early cases,.
and the "vested rights" theory of Holmes, Beale, and many modern cases.
Those theories have been adequately discussed in legal writings 6 and restatement of them is not called-for here. It is appropriate to say that Professor
Cook's approach seems to be a more juristically correct analysis of the nature
II, The Logical Bases of Story's Treatise (31 CoL. L. REv. 368, 1931); IV, The Powersof Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (28 YALE L. J.421, 1919) ; V, The
Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws (36 ILL. L. REv. 493, (1942) ; VI, "Substance" and
"Procedure" (42 YALE L. J.333, 1933); VIII, Characterization (51 YALE L. J. 191,.
1941) ; X, "Immovables" and the "Law" of the "Situs" (52 HARv. L. REV. 1246, 1939) ;
XIII, Tort Liability (35 COL. L. REv. 202, 1935) ; XIV, The "Validity" of "Contracts":
I. The "Place of Contracting" Theory (31 ILL. L. REv. 143, 1936) ; XV, The "Validity"
of "Contracts": II. The "Intentiont" of the Parties (32 ILL. L. Rpv. 899, 1938 and 34
ILL. L. REV. 423, 1939).

5Ch. III, The Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws; VII, Domicil; IX, Renvoi; XI,
The Characterization of "Things" as "Tangible" and "Intangible"; XII, "Movables"
and "Ininovables"; XVI, Capacity to Contract; XVII, Capacity to Marry; XVIII,
Jurisdiction
to Divorce.
6
See Beach, Uniform. Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights (1918) 27 YA. L. 3.
656; Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of'
the Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARV. L. REv. 533; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws, Ch.I
(1937).
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of a conflict of laws decision. None of the three theories goes beyond describing the legal nature of the action of the court in deciding a conflict of laws ease.
They offer little help in the determination of the social, political, economic, or
other extrinsic factors, that should be considered in formulating any particular
conflict of laws rule. However, it is submitted that Professor Cook's approach,
aside from its analytical correctness, has the benefit of opening the door of
one's thinking to a clearer consideration of the purpose and policy of conflict
of laws and to that extent is more helpful than the others. His approach
should make it clear that the judge is making the law in a conflict of laws
case to the same extent that he is in a torts case, a contracts case, or any other
purely domestic case, and that he should act with his mind open to the pur-.
pose for which he is establishing the rule. 7 This does not leave him the
mental latitude of (or excuse for) refusing to refer to foreign law that the
"comity" theory does ;8 nor does it compel the close-minded, tight reference
to some one correct law that so easily accompanies the "vested rights" theory. 9
Thus, this first chapter opens the way for a reconsideration of the confused
rules of conflict of laws. The book is not an attempt to delineate (except as
incidental to its main purpose) what are, or should be, the accepted rules of
law in the field. It is primarily an attempt to subject segments of the field
to the logic of scientific inquiry to determine whether generally accepted
rules in such segments have been validly derived and are wisely stated. As
the author in his preface indicates, he deems it valuable to discover the
numerous existing weeds in the garden and to lay the foundation for eliminating them as the prerequisite of having a more healthy garden in the future.
In various chapters throughout the book, this has resulted in considerable
disagreement with both the method of obtaining the rule and the manner of
stating it in judicial decision, text books, articles, and the Restatement. Thig
disagreement arises largely: (1) because rules have been derived from
assumed rather than from tested propositions; (2) because terms with a wellaccepted meaning in some sphere of the law have been carried over to another
without recognition that their meaning might (and should) vary according
to the context in which used; and, (3) because the terms in which the rules
are stated are (or have been construed to be) unduly confining as compared
to what the courts have done in the past or should do in the future.
In the successive chapters after the first, the application of Professor Cook's
method of inquiry results in many interesting, if unconventional, conclusions. 10
In Chapter II, he explains the extended growth of many misstated rules of
conflict of laws by the fact that the first great treatise in the English language,
by Story in 1834, was predicated on a series of propositions and postulates
mutually inconsistent, and otherwise incapable of standing the test of careful
inquiry. This continues in Chapter III with an attack on the legal bases of
7
Not all judges, even in other fields of the law, are willing to admit that they make
law. There is a certain security in being able to blame it on certain fundamental truths
and the demands of deductive logic.
SFor illustration of the consistently narrow view that this approach leads to, see
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, MD. ANNOT. (1937) § 5.
9
See Reiblich, The Conflict of Laws Philosophy of ilfr. Justice Hohnes (1939) 28 GEo.
L. 0J. 1.
' See notes 4 and 5 supra for chapter titles.

1943]

BOOK REVIEWS

conflict of laws as found in the usually stated rules of jurisdiction, particularly
the misleading "too-sharp" division of power between actions iib personam and
in rein. In this chapter the attack on the Restatement begins. In Chapter IV,
by careful study of the full faith and credit clause of the national Constitution,.
the author shows how Congress might use its power to achieve greater uniformity and reduce the confusion that the courts have created. In Chapter V,
one of the more intricate but most interesting discussions of the book, sharp.
issue is 'taken with the constitutional law dictum of Erie R. Ca. v. Tompkins,"
and the easily assumed "too-broad" interpretation of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Mfg. Co.12 and Griffin v. McCoachl." 3 Again, the author is trying to reserve
in Congress a power to clarify what might be made by the courts into a constitutionally protected muddle. In Chapter VI, in what has been'a most
helpful article to many teachers, the terrifying problem of distinguishing
between substance and procedure is made relatively simple by a clear emphasis
on the wisdom of always being aware of the need of interpreting symbols.
in the light 'of the purpose for which they are used. Once again, the author
is brought into sharp disagreement with the Restatement (which clearly fails.
to do this in its chapter dealing with the problem). Chapter VII on "domicil"
repeats the author's position, as taken on the floor of the American Law
Institute, that an attempt to reduce that term to a definition useful for all.
purposes is not descriptive of the cases and is a violation of the principle of
definition above suggested. In Chapter VIII on characterization, and Chapter
IX on renvoi, the author continues the application of his method to those most
intricate problems and widens the persons guilty of logical errors to include
fellow law teachers and writers of the more liberal school, showing that some
of the problems deemed to be difficult have been created needlessly by faulty
use of terminology. In Chapters X, XI, and XII, discussing the propertyrules in conflict of laws, the author continues to take sharp issue with theRestatement, and with the writers and cases, along the line of emphasizing
how words have become the masters rather than the tools of thought.
This continues through Chapter XIII dealing with torts, and through Chapters XIV, XV, and XVI, dealing with phases of the contracts problem.
These chapters, however, are particularly characterized by the fact that the
author (a little bit more definitely than elsewhere) is moved to indicate hisview of what would serve as a better statement of the rules. Also, in both
discussions, he is attacking particularly the certainty of the place of reference
called for under accepted forms of stating the rules. This, as indicated
earlier, is the chief accompanying weakness of the "vested rights" approach
to the field. As for torts, Professor Cook would be willing to let the plaintiff
have the benefit of whichever domestic rule favors his case. As for contracts,.
he leans toward allowing the expressed intention of the parties appropriately
connected with the "proper law" theory (involving a breaking down of con14
tract problems according to type of contract involved) to govern liability.
In the last two chapters, on capacity to marry and divorce jurisdiction,
11304 U.' S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
12313 U. S. 487, 61 Sup. Ct. 1020 (1941).
33313
U. S. 498, 61 Sup. Ct. 1023 (1941).
14 This is too brief to be fairly descriptive of the author's view.

See pp. 418, 431.
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there is a similar willingness to suggest possible rules in addition to criticizing
existing ones. As to marriage, a preference is manifested toward choosing
domicil, rather than place of ceremony, as the controlling contact and "intended family domicil" rather than prior domicil. As to divorce jurisdiction,
the author is perfectly willing to question the need for having divorce jurisdiction based on domicil as defined by American divorce cases, particularly
if the forum involved looks to the "proper" law for determining the grounds
for the divorce (not necessarily the forum's grounds). This chapter suggests
particularly fertile ground for study.
This brief survey of ideas from each chapter is necessarily incomplete (and
susceptible of inaccurate interpretation except as read with some knowledge
of Professor Cook's beliefs or methods as contained in the book). It is made
solely to tempt others to look into these chapters for themselves.
The effect of the book may be characterized by a reference to the motto
of that great university where this reviewer first had the pleasure of hearing
Professor Cook's ideas of logical and legal method-Veritas Vos Liberabit.
The juristic theory, as above stated from Chapter I, serves to free the judge
or legal critic from the psychologically imposed force of the "vested rights"
idea or narrowness of the "comity" idea. The carefully established scientific
logic of inquiry of the entire work tends to free one from the deceptive
certainty of propositions resting on hidden postulates and the logically (deductive) unavoidable conclusions drawn from them. One is free to pursue the
truth in the sense of making a scientific formulation of the rule which best
describes what courts have done in the past (not veiled by what they have
said), as well as to determine the rule for the future in the light of what
will achieve the best results for the purpose in mind before any particular
court or legislative body.
This embodies, as the author indicates, a recognition that rules of law are
predictions of what will happen as a result of the functioning of state officials
and processes when confronted with the particular activity for which the rule
is laid down. This prediction may be made as a classification of what has
happened in the past, as an indication that similar functioning can be expected
in the future; but, as such, it is subject to expansion or contraction as new
factors enter the picture. The author is unwilling to admit, and is willing to
take up his logical cudgels to disprove, that such rules are derived by deduction alone from pre-existing fundamental truths. Even the major premises
change with the changing nature of the conditions with which they deal and
the social and political organizations which apply them. While postulates may
be used, they are but hypotheses to be tested from time to time, not immutable
truths that bind their creator.
Professor Cook's writings in conflict of laws, collected and completed to
date in this volume have had, and will continue to have, a wholesome influence
on the development of the law in that field and on legal thinking generally.
There are those who agree with his attitude that this subject was by no means
ripe for restatement when it was attempted. This has been vindicated by the
many judicial departures from the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which
prophesy more to come. It may be significant that in a recent case,' 5 the
15 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Pink, -

U. S. -, -, 63 S. Ct. 602, 605 (1943).

"In

19431

BOOK REVIEWS

United States Supreme Court uses language suggestive of thinking along the
lines that are so well illustrated in the instant book and quite opposed to some
attitudes of earlier courts to similar problems. The footnotes of the same
opinion refer to one of the articles reprinted in the book. No thoughtful
student of conflict of laws can afford to ignore the present volume. In so far
as its method of inquiry is applicable throughout the legal field, the book
should command the attention of all legal scholars. It should be on the must
list of judges, lawyers, teachers, and students.
G. Kenneth Reiblich*
Baltimore, Maryland

Personal Estate Planning in a Changing World. By R E
New York: Simon and Schuster. 1942. Pp. xxii, 311.

N

WORMSER.

This little volume is written by a member of the New York bar as "a guide
for the layman to help him plan his estate for his beneficiaries, with particular reference to the adaptation of the old techniques of wills, trusts, life
insurance and gifts, to a rapidly changing economic world." The venture
is a commendable one. It was designed to stimulate the layman to study his
problems before consulting the lawyer, who is to draft his will. Doubtless,
the volume will enable the layman to crystallize his ideas on the subject.
Much of the specific advice given by the author is summed up in the title
of Chapter 3, "Flexibility and Liquidity." The quality of the advice dispensed
i.exemplified briefly:
"Faced with the obscure future, and realizing that much will transpire
which cannot now be anticipated, only an opinionated man would attempt
to lay down an exact, irrevocable, and rigid plan for himself and, more
importantly, for his family. An intelligent man must have opinions. But
to be opinionated is unintelligent."
The occasional illustration reveals an insight into human nature that may
prompt the layman to action as well as self-analysis. To illustrate: Planning
for a spouse may involve the education of the wife.
"Mrs. Smith was not a stupid woman. She was impulsive, perhaps, and
opinionated to a degree. The trouble was that she was totally unprepared
for the job which she had to assume when her protector, her husband,
died. It was not her fault that she lost her money. It was Mr. Smith's
fault.
"While he was alive, Mr. Smith had 'attended to everything.' His
wife was a 'dear little woman,' very capable as a housewife and as a homedetermining the power of a state to apply its own regulatory laws to insurance business
activities, the question in earlier cases became involved by conceptualistic discussion of
theories of the place of contracting or of performance [note omitted]. More recently, it
has been recognized that a state may have substantial interests in the business of insurance
of its people or property regardless of these isolated factors."
*Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School.
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maker, but completely unfamiliar with business. Several times, when he
had discussed something of importance with her which concerned the
family assets and her future, she had said, 'John, dear, I don't know anything about those things. You decide what to do. I know your judgment
will be best.' John Smith was flattered at this confidence his wife had
in him, and left it at that. He planned nothing."
Economic security is the protection which should be secured for the wife;
the motivating objective in planning for the children is preparing them for
life. Planning for future generations may be folly.
The author admits that the estate tax is a sad subject, which is getting
sadder every year. The tax problems and the problems of charities as well as
other problerfis involved in the planning of a will are discussed at length. Some
of the exposition may seem elementary to the lawyer; to the layman it may
seem otherwise. If at times the language is rather diffuse, it is not infrequently
quite vivid.
"You can't completely preclude your family from fighting over the
estate after your death. Families seem to love to do it. But you can
minimize the possibilities by leaving a will so carefully prepared that
there's little or nothing to scrap about. It will save making wildcats out
of your relatives."
There are nine check lists scattered through the book at appropriate places
to enable one to'see at a glance the material presented in summary form. There
are also helpful check lists in the appendices to refresh the memory for
further reflection upon the problems which the preparation of a will entails.
Some devotees of insurance may vigorously object to the author's reviving
that vulgar myth that insurance is a gamble. "All these types of insurance
involve the principle that you gamble with the company, and the very gamble
affords a protection." In light of the historical development of insurance, tocall the distribution of risk for purposes of social security a gamble is not
particularly felicitous. It is suggestive of a primitive fixation long since repudiated by the courts, yet still prevalent in the popular mind.
Herbert D. Laube*
Ithaca, New York
Federal Taxes on Estates, Trusts and Gifts, 1942-43.
By ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY. New York: The Ronald Press Co. 1943. Pp. viii, 769.
$7.50.
This new edition of Colonel Montgomery's book on estates and trusts is
a welcome addition to his series of handbooks. 'It would be hard to name a
volume in the tax field where so much useful information is packed into so
compact an amount of space. Problems of estates, trusts, and gifts are carefully analyzed, and the leading authorities are stated or cited. Anyone who
*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
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wants to get a quick picture of the law on one of these topics will find what he
wants in the present work, though he may want to turn to one of the larger
works or to a Tax Service after his bird's eye view has served its purpose.
The present volume includes the changes made by the Revenue -Act of
1942 and thus is thoroughly up to date. In some places it would have been
interesting to have had a more extensive analysis than was possible in the
time available to the author. For instance, he says (p. 122) that in his
opinion "the language of the amendments incorporated in section 162 of the
Code by the 1942 Act is ambiguous and needs clarification." This is a view
that has been shared by others, nd it is to be hoped that Colonel Montgomery will be able to enlarge his discussion of the problems arising under
this section when it comes time to issue a new edition of his work. Another
illustration may be found at page 341, where the author states his opinion
that "a power to accelerate, i.e., to distribute the corpus to a designated
beneficiary prior to the time otherwise specified in the trust instrument for
such distribution should not be construed as a power to terminate." Since
this is a very real problem in the case of many outstanding trusts, it would
have been helpful if the author could have expanded his argument on this
point.
The discussion of the new power of appointment provisions (pp. 341-346)
is disappointing, being confined largely to the text of the statute and a long
excerpt from a committee report. Now that the regulations on this subject
have appeared, it may be expected that the author will soon have occasion to
express himself with his accustomed' vigor. It may be said, however, that the
present book has much less of the super-conservative viewpoint in it than
has sometimes been found in some of the author's earlier books.
As usual, there is a final Chapter on Planning the Distribution of an
Estate. This contains a number of valuable suggestions, although the opportunities for doing anything startling in this field have been gradually decreasing. The book closes with complete tables and an excellent index. It
is a very good handbook, well deserving of the place which it has already
established for itself in the field.
Erwin N. Griswold*
Cambridge, Massachusetts
*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

